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A NOTE ON THE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS WHEN
TALENT IS UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED
By Simon Demers
Optimal stopping problems give rise to random distributions de-
scribing how many applicants the decision-maker will observe or in-
terview before choosing one, a quantity sometimes referred to as the
stopping time or search time. Despite the fact that is has impor-
tant practical implications, this quantity’s statistical properties are
not widely studied. This short research note considers how many in-
terviews are expected to be conducted when a decision-maker has
to choose a candidate from a pool of sequential applicants with uni-
formly distributed talent and no recall, in the vein of previously stud-
ied Cayley-Moser, Secretary and Sultan’s Dowry Problems. In terms
of theoretical contribution, we derive algebraically the expected num-
ber of interviews in the no-information setting where the decision-
maker can only assess whether each applicant is the best one observed
so far. In terms of empirical contribution, we present new conjectures
around the mean and median number of interviews that will be con-
ducted asymptotically in full-information settings.
1. Introduction. Although optimal stopping problems have been stud-
ied and refined extensively over time (Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966; Ferguson,
1989a), little is currently known about the statistical properties of the ran-
dom distributions they give rise to. For example, it is not necessarily obvious
how the expected number of observations (“applicants”) to be considered
(“interviewed”) before one is ultimately chosen (“hired”) will vary when the
decision-maker (“employer”) can observe the actual payoff values (“talent”)
or when the horizon (“applicant pool”) grows. This is unfortunate because
it might be useful in some practical settings to anticipate, for example, how
many interviews the decision-maker should plausibly schedule or prepare
for. This is what this short note attempts to elucidate.
The focus is on the problem of choosing a candidate from a pool of
applicants with uniformly distributed talent. We first provide some back-
ground information about the problem and summarize some useful earlier
results (Section 2). In terms of theoretical contribution (Section 3), we de-
rive algebraically the mean and median number of interviewed applicants
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expected within the no-information setting, where the decision-maker can
only assess applicants using a rank-based indicator (Bearden, 2006) or only
cares about choosing the best candidate anyway, as in the classical Secre-
tary Problem or the Sultan’s Dowry Problem of Mosteller (1987). In terms
of empirical contribution, we estimate the expected number of interviewed
applicants within the full-information settings of Moser (1956) and Gilbert
and Mosteller (1966), where payoff values are observable. This allows us to
present new conjectures around the mean and median number of interviews
that will be conducted asymptotically (Section 4).
2. Background and Known Results. Consider the problem of a
decision-maker (“employer”) who is looking for the best possible candidate
(“hire”) out of a random sequence of N applicants sampled from a uniform
distribution but cannot recall previously considered applicants who have
been passed on.
2.1. Full Information, Cardinal Payoffs. Assume for now that the decision-
maker’s payoff value is determined by the selected candidate’s attractiveness,
quality, or intrinsic value (interchangeably) and that the decision-maker can
actually observe each sequential applicant’s attractiveness (“payoff value”).
This is the full-information setting of Moser (1956).
Let Xi be the payoff associated with the i
th applicant. Assume that the
observations X1,X2, . . . ,XN are independent and identically distributed,
drawn from a known uniform distribution scaled on the interval [0, 1].
As a reminder, when there are m = N − i applicants left to be observed
(“interviewed”), the optimal stopping rule consists in stopping and choos-
ing the ith applicant whenever Xi > Am, where Am is defined recursively
(inductively) with A0 = 0, A1 = 0.5 and Am+1 = (A
2
m+1)/2 (Moser, 1956).
When the pool of applicants left to be observed is large enough, the cutoff
points can be approximated as: Am ≃ 1− 2/[m+ ln(m) + 1.76799] (Gilbert
and Mosteller, 1966). Of interest, Mazalov and Peshkov (2004) previously
proved that the expected number of interviews in that setting converges
asymptotically to N/3.
2.2. No Information, Cardinal Payoffs. Fifty years after Moser (1956),
Bearden (2006) considered a similar problem but assumed instead that the
decision-maker could only observe an indicator revealing whether each ap-
plicant is the relatively best observed so far, in the true tradition of the
Secretary Problem (Ferguson, 1989a). This is the no-information setting
with cardinal payoffs.
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As shown by Bearden (2006), the optimal strategy for the decision-maker
who can only observe whether each successive applicant is the relatively
best so far but cannot observe the actual payoff values is to reject the first√
N − 1 applicants (rounded to the nearest integer) and select the next
candidate identified as the relatively best so far, or the N th applicant if
none turns out to be relatively better than the
√
N − 1 applicants observed
initially.
The reasoning behind the threshold rule obtained by Bearden (2006) is
as follows. The decision-maker only observes an indicator Ii, where Ii = 1
if and only if the ith applicant is the relatively most attractive (best) so far
and Ii = 0 otherwise. Let T be the number of applicants interviewed before
one is hired. Given a pool of N applicants and an arbitrary threshold of c
applicants with 1 ≤ c ≤ N , the probability that the xth applicant will be
the relatively best candidate is:
(1) Pr(T = x) =


[
x−1∏
s=c
(
s− 1
s
)]
1
x
=
c− 1
x(x− 1) if c < x < N
N−1∏
s=c
(
s− 1
s
)
=
c− 1
N − 1 if x = N
0 otherwise.
Given that the xth applicant is identified as the relatively best, its ex-
pected payoff value is E(Xx|Ix = 1) = x/(x + 1). If the decision-maker
is instead compelled to select the last (N th) applicant by default, the ex-
pected value is simply the unconditional mean: E(XN ) = 0.5. Combining
these arguments, Bearden (2006) showed that the expected value for the
decision-maker is:
EV (c) =
N−1∑
x=c
[
x−1∏
s=c
(
s− 1
s
)](
1
x+ 1
)
+ 0.5
N−1∏
s=c
(
s− 1
s
)
=
N−1∑
x=c
(
c− 1
x− 1
)(
1
x+ 1
)
+ 0.5
(
c− 1
N − 1
)
=
2Nc− c2 + c−N
2Nc
(2)
It is a matter of algebra to show that this expected value is maximized
by setting c∗ =
√
N . That is, the optimal strategy for the decision-maker is
to reject the first
√
N − 1 applicants (rounded to the nearest integer) and
select the next candidate identified as the relatively best so far. Under this
optimal selection strategy, the decision-maker’s expected value is EV (c∗) =
1− (2√N − 1)/(2N).
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2.3. No Information, Best Choice. When the decision-maker cannot ob-
serve the payoff values but only cares about choosing the best applicant
anyway, maximizing the expected payoff becomes equivalent to maximiz-
ing the probability of selecting the best applicant. This case is sometimes
referred to as the Sultan’s Dowry Problem (Mosteller, 1987) but it embod-
ies all the essential elements of the classical Secretary Problem (Ferguson,
1989a).
Given an arbitrary threshold rule with threshold c, the probability that
the best applicant will be chosen is:
Pr(c) =
N∑
k=c
1
N
c− 1
k − 1 =
c− 1
N
N∑
k=c
1
k − 1(3)
The optimal threshold value c∗ that maximizes Eq. (3) is the first c such
that Pr(c + 1) ≤ Pr(c), which reduces to ∑Nc+1 1/(k − 1) ≤ 1. The optimal
thresholds for applicant pools of size N ≤ 1000 are given by the integer
sequence A054404 in the OEIS (2018), while useful algebraic approximations
are given by Weisstein (2004).
Asymptotically, it is well known that the optimal threshold tends towards
c∗ ∼ N/e and, equivalently, the proportion of applicants who will be passed
over tends to c∗/N ∼ e−1 ≈ 0.368. This follows directly from the fact that∑N
c+1(k − 1)−1 ∼ ln(N/c), and therefore ln(N/c∗) ∼ 1 and c∗/N ∼ e−1.
Incidentally, the probability of successfully choosing the single best applicant
also tends towards e−1 as the pool size becomes very large (Ferguson, 1989a).
2.4. Full Information, Best Choice. Finally, Gilbert and Mosteller (1966)
studied the optimal stopping rule and expected success rate of the decision-
maker who can observe the payoff values but only cares about choosing
the best applicant. This case is the full-information, best-choice problem
(Gnedin, 1996).
In that setting, when there are m = N − i applicants left to be observed
(“interviewed”), the optimal stopping rule consists in stopping and choosing
the ith applicant whenever Xi > Am, where A0 = 0 and Am is the solution
to
∑m
j=1(1/Am
j − 1)/j = 1 for m = 1, 2, . . . (Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966;
Gnedin, 1996).
Asymptotically, when the pool of applicants left to be observed is large
enough, the cutoff points are approximately Am ≃ (1 − c/m), where c =
0.804352 . . . is the solution (Gnedin, 1996) to:
(4)
∞∑
j=1
cj
j! j
= 1.
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2.5. Summary. Table 1 summarizes the four prototypical decision-making
settings previously mentioned. Freeman (1983) and Ferguson (1989a) both
discuss several extensions and provide ample historical context. Formal math-
ematical proofs are carefully explained in the book by Ferguson (2008), while
Christian and Griffiths (2016) illustrates in a wonderfully intuitive manner
several key results.
Setting Info. Payoffs Horizon
Moser (1956) Full Information Cardinal Known N
Bearden (2006) Best So Far Cardinal Known N
Mosteller (1987) Best So Far Best Choice {0, 1} Known N
GM (1966) Full Information Best Choice {0, 1} Known N
Table 1
Basic variants of optimal stopping problems.
3. Exact Results for the No-Information Setting. Importantly,
the number of applicants expected to be observed (“interviewed”) by the
decision-maker before a candidate is ultimately chosen is much greater than√
N − 1 in the Bearden (2006) setting or N/e (asymptotically) in the con-
text of the Sultan’s Dowry Problem (Mosteller, 1987). In fact, in repeated
samples, the decision-maker would be expected to interview at least twice
as many applicants half the time.
3.1. Median Number of Interviews. This can be seen by recognizing that
the theoretical median of T in the no-information setting, based on the
probability distribution function in Eq. (1), is generally the smallest integer
T such that:
T∑
x=c∗
c∗ − 1
x(x− 1) = (c
∗ − 1)
T∑
x=c∗
1
x(x− 1) =
(
1− c
∗ − 1
T
)
≥ 0.5(5)
which yields explicitly T˜ = 2(c∗ − 1).
In the Bearden (2006) setting, where c∗ =
√
N , this means the median
number of interviews is T˜ = 2(
√
N − 1). In the Sultan’s Dowry Problem of
Mosteller (1987), where it is well known that the optimal threshold tends
asymptotically to N/e (Ferguson, 1989a), the median number of interviews
will also converge to twice the threshold value: T˜ ∼ 2N/e.
More percentiles are summarized in Table 2. These percentiles apply to
the entire class of no-information problems for which the optimal choice can
be described in the form of an optimal threshold rule, and this threshold
rule consists of skipping the first c∗ − 1 applicants before selecting the next
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relatively best candidate. They apply not only asymptotically but also for
smaller pools of applicants.
Percentile Interviews
Pr(T < x) ×(c∗ − 1)
0.10 1.11
0.20 1.25
Q1 = 0.25 1.33
0.33 1.5
Median = 0.50 2
0.66 3
Q3 = 0.75 4
0.80 5
0.90 10
Table 2
Number of interviews by percentile in the no-information setting, as a multiple of the
optimal threshold value.
3.2. Mean Number of Interviews. In the same vein, the expected number
of interviewed applicants in the no-information setting is:
E(T ) =
N−1∑
x=c∗
c∗ − 1
x− 1 +
N(c∗ − 1)
N − 1
= (c∗ − 1)
[
N
N − 1 +
N−1∑
x=c∗
1
x− 1
]
= (c∗ − 1)
[
N
N − 1 + ψ(N − 1) − ψ(c
∗ − 1)
]
(6)
where ψ(·) is the digamma function (Stern, 1847).
Eq. (6) applies to the entire class of no-information problems for which
the optimal stopping strategy can be described in the form of an optimal
threshold rule, and this threshold rule consists of skipping the first c∗ − 1
applicants before selecting the next relatively best candidate. It applies not
only asymptotically but also for smaller pools of applicants.
3.2.1. Large Number of Applicants. When the number of applicants is
large and the threshold rule in the no-information setting dictates that a
fixed proportion c∗/N = x of these applicants will be passed over before a
candidate is finally chosen, Eq. (6) simplifies asymptotically to:
(7)
E(T )
N
∼ x [1− ln(x)]
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3.2.2. Cardinal Payoffs. Specifically in the Bearden (2006) setting with
cardinal payoffs, Eq. (6) reduces to:
E(T ) = (
√
N − 1)
[
N
N − 1 + ψ(N − 1) − ψ(
√
N − 1)
]
≈ (
√
N − 1) [1 + 0.5 lnN ] + 1.5,(8)
where the approximation reflects the second-order generalized Puiseux series
expansion and is always accurate up to the nearest integer.
As a side note, it should be obvious that the proportion of interviewed
applicants tends to zero asymptotically in the Bearden (2006) setting, in the
sense that:
(9) lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
≈ lim
N→∞
(
√
N − 1) [1 + 0.5 lnN ]
N
+
1.5
N
= 0
and
(10) lim
N→∞
T˜
N
= lim
N→∞
2(
√
N − 1)
N
= 0.
3.2.3. Sultan’s Dowry Problem. In the context of the classical Secretary
Problem or the Sultan’s Dowry Problem of Mosteller (1987), Mazalov and
Peshkov (2004) previously reported that the expected number of interviews
converges asymptotically to 2N/e ≈ 0.736N . We note in passing that this
result can be obtained directly using Eq. (6).
Taking the well-established asymptotic threshold of c∗−1 = N/e as given
(Ferguson, 1989a), we have:
lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
=
(
1
e
)
[1 + ln(e)] =
2
e
≈ 0.736(11)
On average, if the Sultan has a large number of daughters, the commoner
will see approximately 73.6% of them by the time he asks one in marriage.
Half the time, he will see more. Half the time, he will see fewer. Of course,
half of the daughters observed by the commoner will have been passed over
automatically in accordance with the optimal threshold rule.
Notably, out of all optimal stopping problems that are solved using a
threshold rule, the classical Secretary Problem is the setting in which the
decision-maker should expect to interview the most applicants after the
optimal threshold was reached. This is illustrated by Figure 1.
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x
x [1− ln(x)]
1/e
1/e
2/e
x [1− ln(x)]− x
Fig 1. Maximum distance between the optimal threshold (c∗/N = x) and the expected
proportion of interviewed applicants as given by Eq. (7) is achieved asymptotically when
x = e−1. This is precisely the solution of the classical Secretary P
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3.2.4. Win-Lose-Draw Marriage Problem. If we were to consider the
marriage problem of Sakaguchi (1984), where the payoff is 1 if the decision-
maker marries the best,−1 if the decision-maker marries any other candidate
who is not the best, and the decision-maker can settle for a neutral payoff of
0 by not getting married, the optimal threshold for an asymptotically large
pool size would be instead c∗ − 1 = N/√e ≈ 0.607N (Ferguson, 1989b).
In that case, the proportion of applicants who can expect to be interviewed
converges asymptotically to:
lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
=
(
1√
e
) [
1 + ln(
√
e)
]
=
3
2
√
e
≈ 0.910(12)
In other words, a whopping 91.0% of all applicants can expect to be
interviewed in the Sakaguchi (1984) setting, on average. Of course, it makes
sense that most applicants can expect to be interviewed because the decision-
maker in the Sakaguchi (1984) setting will actually end up interviewing all N
applicants without choosing one with probability approaching (c∗− 1)/N ∼
1/
√
e ≈ 0.607.
3.2.5. Uncertain Employment. Another way to extend the classical sec-
retary problem is to allow for the possibility that the chosen candidate may
be unavailable or may refuse an offer of employment with a fixed probability.
This is the framework introduced by Smith (1975).
Within the context of the Sultan’s Dowry Problem, suppose that any of
the N daughters can turn down the commoner and refuse his marriage offer
with probability 1 − p. When this occurs, the search for a consenting bride
continues. It turns out that the optimal threshold asymptotically tends to
c∗ ∼ Np1/(1−p) (Smith, 1975), in the sense that:
(13) lim
N→∞
c∗
N
= p1/(1−p)
As a side note, Eq. (13) is also the probability of marrying the best daughter
using the optimal threshold rule.
In that case, the proportion of applicants who can expect to be interviewed
converges asymptotically to:
lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
= p1/(1−p)
[
1− ln
(
p1/(1−p)
)]
= p1/(1−p)
[
1− ln(p)
1− p
]
(14)
When p = 0.5, for instance, c∗/N = 1/4 and E(T )/N = [1 + 2 ln (2)]/4 =
0.596574. As p → 1, we retrieve as expected the solution for the classical
Secretary Problem: c∗/N ∼ e−1 and E(T )/N ∼ 2/e.
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3.2.6. Unknown Number of Applicants. Suppose that the actual num-
ber of applicants (N) was not precisely known in the Secretary or Sultan’s
Dowry Problem but was distributed instead uniformly on {1, . . . , b} with a
known maximum pool size b. (Of note, the actual number of applicants is
expected to be E(N) = b/2 on average.) The decision-maker wins by select-
ing the very best applicant. Otherwise, if the decision-maker passes up on
the last applicant without making a selection, he or she loses. This is the
Presman-Sonin best-choice problem (Presman and Sonin, 1972; Rasmussen
and Robbins, 1975).
Asymptotically, when b is large, the threshold as a proportion of the
maximum pool size converges to c∗/b = e−2 ≈ 0.135 or, as a proportion of
the expected pool size, E(c∗/N) = 2e−2 ≈ 0.271. Incidentally, the latter is
also the average probability of successfully selecting the single best applicant.
In turn, the proportion of applicants who can expect to be interviewed
(out of the N applicants) converges to:
lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
=
2
e2
[
1− ln
(
2e−2
)]
=
6− 2 ln(2)
e2
≈ 0.624(15)
4. Conjectures in the Full-Information Setting. Unfortunately,
deriving algebraic formulas that describe for any pool size N the expected
number of interviewed applicants in the full-information setting of Moser
(1956) and Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) remains an open problem. How-
ever, it is relatively straightforward to estimate numerically the expected
number of interviews for any given pool size N , as long as we are able to
compute the cutoff points (also known as the critical values, minimum ac-
ceptable values, or optimal stopping thresholds) with a sufficient degree of
precision. This approach has the potential to be especially useful and prac-
tical with smaller applicant pools for which the asymptotic limit of N/3
derived by Mazalov and Peshkov (2004) in the Moser (1956) setting, for
example, is not a satisfactory approximation.
Let Am = Pi refer to the cutoff point when there are m = N − i appli-
cants left to be observed or, stated differently, for the ith applicant observed
by the decision-maker. As before, let T be the number of applicants inter-
viewed before one is hired. Keeping in mind that the payoff values observed
sequentially by the decision-maker are drawn from a uniform distribution,
the probability that no candidate before the xth applicant will have a value
larger than its corresponding cutoff point is
∏x−1
i=1 Pi. Since the x
th applicant
will have a value larger than its corresponding cutoff point Px with proba-
bility (1−Px), the ex ante probability that the xth applicant will be selected
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by the decision-maker setting is:
(16) Pr(T = x) = (1− Px)
x−1∏
i=1
Pi
In turn, the expected number of interviews in that full-information setting
is:
(17) E(T ) =
N∑
x=1
{
x (1− Px)
x−1∏
i=1
Pi
}
In the presence of N = 107 applicants, for example, the decision-maker
in the Moser (1956) setting can expect to conduct approximately 3,333,339
interviews on average. Of course, the fact that this closely approximates N/3
should not come as a surprise in light of the asymptotic result previously
derived by Mazalov and Peshkov (2004).
Numerical results for the full-information settings of Moser (1956) and
Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) are summarized in Table 3. The corresponding
theoretical predictions in the Bearden (2006) setting and in the context of
the Sultan’s Dowry Problem (Mosteller, 1987) are included for comparison
purposes.
1
2
S
.
D
E
M
E
R
S
Cardinal Payoffs Best Choice
Full Information Best So Far Best So Far Full Information
Pool Size Moser (1956) Bearden (2006) Mosteller (1987) GM (1966)
(N) E(T ) E(T )/N T˜ T˜ /N E(T ) T˜ E(T ) T˜ E(T ) T˜
9 4.23844 0.4709 3 0.3333 5.68571 4 7.02857 6 5.33035 5
25 9.87275 0.3949 8 0.3200 11.9372 8 18.8979 18 14.1852 14
49 18.0805 0.3690 15 0.3061 19.1778 12 36.7214 36 27.4816 28
64 23.1646 0.3619 20 0.3125 23.0590 14 47.2265 46 35.7812 36
100 35.3069 0.3531 30 0.3000 31.2266 18 74.4780 74 55.6381 57
400 135.758 0.3394 118 0.2950 77.4217 38 294.837 294 221.757 230
2500 836.365 0.3345 734 0.2936 242.191 98 1840.38 1840 1385.56 1443
10000 3336.83 0.3337 2931 0.2931 556.413 198 7358.48 7358 5542.16 5775
1000000 333338 0.3333 292897 0.2929 7901.35 1998 735759 735758 554216 577575
Table 3
Expected and median number of interviews.
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Table 3 reveals a few stylized facts. First, for a given pool size (N) and
informational setting, the decision-maker who only cares about picking the
best applicant is expected to conduct more interviews compared to the
decision-maker who is rewarded based on the actual intrinsic value of the se-
lected candidate. Moreover, in a best-choice setting, the decision-maker who
only receives a rank-based signal (Mosteller, 1987) is expected to conduct
more interviews for a given pool size compared to the decision-maker who
can observe the actual payoff values (Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966). We note
in passing that this is not strictly true in a setting with cardinal payoffs. As
long as there are fewer than N = 64 available applicants under considera-
tion, fewer interviews are expected to take place when the payoff values are
fully observable by the decision-maker (Moser, 1956) compared to when the
decision-maker only receives a rank-based signal of relative attractiveness
(Bearden, 2006). However, as soon as the pool of applicants grows beyond
64 or so choices, the decision-maker who can observe the actual payoff values
will be expected to conduct more interviews on average in a setting with
cardinal payoffs.
4.1. Median in Moser (1956). Using the probability distribution func-
tion in Eq. (16) to calculate the median in the full-information setting of
Moser (1956), it is possible to show that the decision-maker who has access
to N = 106 applicants is equally likely to conduct more or less than 292,897
interviews. With N = 107 applicants, the median is 2,928,936 interviews.
This leads us to speculate without being able to prove mathematically
that the median proportion of interviews in the Moser (1956) setting con-
verges asymptotically in accordance with:
(18) lim
N→∞
T˜
N
≃ (1−
√
0.5) ≈ 0.292893
In other words, a decision-maker in the Moser (1956) setting who deals with
a large pool of applicants should plan to interview at least (no more than)
29.29% of those applicants roughly half the time.
This result and the earlier finding reported by Mazalov and Peshkov
(2004) would be consistent with the fact that the number of interviews
(T ) in the Moser (1956) setting is asymptotically distributed as a left tri-
angular distribution with lower limit a = 0, upper limit b = N , and mode
c = 0. It is well known that in such a case the mean is (a+ b+ c)/3 = N/3,
the median is b − √(b− a)(b− c)/2 = N(1 − √0.5), and the variance is
(a2 + b2 + c2 − ab− ac− bc)/18 = N2/18 (Ayyangar, 1941).
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4.1.1. Moser (1956) with Decaying Applicant Pool. One possible varia-
tion of the full-information setting of Moser (1956) is to assume that the
applicant pool decays or declines over time, in the sense that the single
best applicant leaves the competition after each successive interview. Math-
ematically, each independent observation Xi is assumed to be drawn from a
(non-identical) uniform distribution over the interval [0, N+1−i] (Ferguson,
2008, Chap. 2, Exercise 9).
As before, it makes sense to always accept the last observation XN if
we get that far, so A0 = 0. By assumption, that last observation is uni-
formly distributed over the interval [0, 1] and it is therefore expected to yield
E(XN−1) = 1/2, so we accept the second before last observation XN−1 if it
is at least A1 = 0.5. More generally, when there arem = N−i applicants left
to be observed (“interviewed”), it turns out that the optimal stopping rule
consists in stopping and choosing the ith observation whenever it is larger
than the following cutoff point defined recursively (inductively):
(19) Am =
1
2
(
m+
A2m−1
m
)
When the pool of applicants left to be observed is large enough, it turns
out that the cutoff points tend to Am ≃ m−
√
2m (Ferguson, 2008, Chap. 2,
Exercise 9).
If we get to the ith observation, it will be rejected with probability Am/(N+
1 − i). As in the classical Moser (1956) setting, these cutoff probabilities
can be used to estimate Eq. (16) and Eq. (17). This makes it possible to
show that the decision-maker who has access initially to N = 106 appli-
cants would be expected to conduct 707.107 interviews on average. With
N = 107 applicants, the mean is 2,236.07 interviews. This leads us to spec-
ulate without being able to prove mathematically that the mean proportion
of interviews in the Moser (1956) setting with declining applicant quality
converges asymptotically to E(T) ≃ √N/2. Similarly, the median appears
to converge to T˜ ≃ ln (2)√N/2.
These computational results would be consistent with the idea that the
number of interviews (T ) in the Moser (1956) setting with a decaying appli-
cant pool is asymptotically distributed as an exponential distribution with
the reciprocal of the rate parameter λ−1 = β =
√
N/2.
Of note, a decision-maker in the full-information setting of Moser (1956)
who has to deal with a decaying applicant pool will be expected to conduct
an even shorter search than in the Bearden (2006) setting. As in the Bearden
(2006) setting, the proportion of interviewed applicants will shrink towards
zero as the number of applicants grows.
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4.1.2. House-Selling Problem. Another way to extend the problem posed
by Moser (1956) is to impose search costs, while allowing for an unbounded
search horizon. This is the framework outlined by Sakaguchi (1961). In that
case, it turns out that the cutoff point is time-invariant and the mean and
median number of expected observations can therefore be expressed as a
closed-form solution.
Imagine that something is for sale. Perhaps this could be a house as in the
house-selling problem of MacQueen and Miller (1960), or labor as in the job
search problem of Stigler (1962). Let X1,X2, . . . denote the independent and
identically distributed offers that arrive sequentially, with no possibility of
recall. Assume that these values are drawn randomly from a known uniform
distribution scaled on the interval [0, 1], with no finite limit on the number
of offers that can be considered. Suppose that each new observed offer costs
a relative amount c > 0, which could be interpreted interchangeably as
search costs, opportunity costs of searching, ongoing maintenance costs, or
inventory carrying costs. By construction, the net payoff for accepting the
kth offer is Xk − kc. When an offer is received, the dilemma is whether it
should be accepted or the search for a better offer should continue.
The case with c > 0.5 is trivial because it never makes sense in that
case to observe more than one offer since the cumulative search costs could
never be recovered by any subsequent offer: 2c > 1 = max{Xi}. In fact,
even the first offer has a negative expected net payoff when c > 0.5. That
is, E(X1)− c = 0.5− c < 0.
When c ≤ 0.5, the optimal rule is to accept the first offer greater than or
equal to the cutoff point γ∗ = 1−√2c , where γ∗ is the solution to
(20)
∫ 1
γ
(x− γ)dx = (1− γ)
2
2
= c.
Now, let T represent the number of offers that are considered before the
asset (e.g. house) is finally sold. Given γ∗ = 1−√2c, the expected number
of offers to be observed is:
(21) E(T ) =
∞∑
k=1
k
(
1−
√
2c
)k−1√
2c =
1√
2c
Similarly, it can be shown that the median number of offers would be:
(22) T˜ =
⌈
ln 0.5
ln (1−√2c)
⌉
=
⌈
−1
log2 (1−
√
2c)
⌉
These computational results would be consistent with the idea that the
number of interviews (T ) in the House-Selling Problem is asymptotically
distributed as a geometric distribution with parameter p =
√
2c.
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Even a small search cost of c = 0.001 (0.1%) per offer would result in
a relatively short expected search time of 22.36 offers and a median search
time of only 15.15 offers. A search cost of c = 0.01 (1%) per offer would
shrink the search time down to approximately 7.07 offers on average, with
fewer or more than 4.55 offers with an equal probability.
4.2. Mean and Median in Gilbert and Mosteller (1966). Using the same
approach to calculate the mean and median in the full-information, best-
choice setting of Gilbert and Mosteller (1966), it is possible to show that
the decision-maker who has access to N = 106 applicants would be expected
to conduct approximately 554,215 interviews on average. With N = 107 ap-
plicants, the mean is 5,542,156 interviews. This leads us to speculate without
being able to prove mathematically that the mean proportion of interviews
in the Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) setting converges asymptotically in ac-
cordance with:
(23) lim
N→∞
E(T )
N
≃ 1
1 + c
≈ 0.5542156,
again referring to c = 0.804352 . . . as the solution to Eq. (4).
Similarly, the median withN = 107 applicants in the Gilbert and Mosteller
(1966) setting is approximately 5,775,760 interviews. This leads us to specu-
late without being able to prove mathematically that the median proportion
of interviews in the full-information best-choice setting converges asymptot-
ically to:
(24) lim
N→∞
T˜
N
≃ 2φ(0.5) ≈ 0.577576,
where φ(x) =
∏
∞
j=1
(
1− xj) is “the” Euler function, a special case of the
q-Pochhammer series (q; q)∞.
In other words, a decision-maker in the Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) set-
ting who deals with a large pool of applicants should plan to interview at
least (no more than) 57.76% of those applicants roughly half the time. On
average, the decision-maker will interview 55.42% of the applicants.
4.3. Summary of Asymptotic Results. For greater clarity and to put our
earlier conjectures in context, Table 4 summarizes asymptotic results that
can be used to estimate the mean and median number of interviews in the
full-information settings of Moser (1956) and Gilbert and Mosteller (1966),
where the decision-maker can observe the uniformly distributed payoff val-
ues, as well as the no-information settings of Presman and Sonin (1972),
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS 17
Mosteller (1987) and Sakaguchi (1984), where the decision-maker only re-
ceives a signal of relative rank. Specifically in the Sakaguchi (1984) setting,
the decision-maker also has the option to not pick any applicant even after
interviewing all of them.
1
8
S
.
D
E
M
E
R
S
Setting Info. Payoffs Mean (T¯ /N) Median (T˜ /N)
Moser (1956) FI, Known N Cardinal 1/3 ≈ 0.333333 1−√0.5 ≈ 0.292893
GM (1966) FI, Known N BC {0, 1} 1/(1 + 0.804352 . . . ) ≈ 0.554216 2 · φ(0.5) ≈ 0.577576
PS (1972) BSF, N ∼ U(1, b) BC {0, 1} [6− 2 ln(2)] /e2 ≈ 0.624397 4/e2 ≈ 0.541341
Mosteller (1987) BSF, Known N BC {0, 1} 2/e ≈ 0.735759 2/e ≈ 0.735759
Sakaguchi (1984) BSF, Known N BC {−1, 0, 1} (3/2)/√e ≈ 0.909796 1
FI: Full Information. BSF: Best So Far Indicator. BC: Best Choice.
Table 4
Asymptotic mean and median proportion of interviewed applicants (N →∞). The decision-maker observes the uniformly distributed
payoff values (Moser, 1956; Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966) or only cares about picking the best applicant anyway (Sakaguchi, 1984;
Mosteller, 1987). In the Presman and Sonin (1972) setting, the exact number of available applicants is not known precisely but is
assumed to be uniformly distributed over the known interval {1, . . . , b}.
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Coincidentally, the median proportion of interviewed applicants expected
in the Presman and Sonin (1972) setting is precisely the square of the me-
dian proportion of interviewed applicants in the Mosteller (1987) setting
and approximately the square root of the median proportion of interviewed
applicants expected in the Moser (1956) setting.
5. Conclusion. Optimal stopping problems give rise to random distri-
butions describing how many interviews might be conducted by the decision-
maker. Despite the fact that they have practical implications, these proba-
bility distributions are rarely studied. This short research note focuses on the
problem of choosing a candidate from a pool of applicants with uniformly
distributed talent.
In terms of new theoretical results, we offer that the median number
of interviews in the no-information settings is the integer closest to T˜ =
2(c∗−1) (Section 3), where c∗ = √N in the Bearden (2006) setting and c∗−
1 ∼ N/e asymptotically in the classical Secretary Problem or the Sultan’s
Dowry Problem of Mosteller (1987). For its part, the expected number of
interviews in the no-information setting is given by Eq. (6). Asymptotically,
the proportion of applicants who can expected to be interviewed goes to
x[1 − ln (x)], where x is the proportion of applicants who should be passed
over based on the optimal threshold rule.
A good rule-of-thumb within the full-information setting of Moser (1956)
is that approximately (and no fewer than) one third of all applicants should
expect to be interviewed on average, an asymptotic result due to Mazalov
and Peshkov (2004). We confirm this empirically in Section 4. In fact, the
numerical estimates allow us to conjecture that approximately 1 −√0.5 =
29.29% of all applicants should be interviewed at least half the time. In the
full-information best-choice setting of Gilbert and Mosteller (1966), we con-
jecture without being able to prove mathematically that the mean propor-
tion of interviews converges asymptotically to T¯ /N ≃ 1/(1+0.804352 . . . ) ≈
0.5542156 and the median proportion of interviews converges asymptotically
to T˜ /N ≃ 2φ(0.5) ≈ 0.577576. Proving these conjectures mathematically re-
mains an open problem.
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